Stackelberg leader a Markov perfect preemption equilibrium obtains in which the leader invests earlier, and the follower later, than in the Cournot benchmark scenario. There is rent equalization, and the two firms' equilibrium value is lower. This result is not robust to the introduction of firm-specific limited mobility constraints. If one firm is sufficiently less able than its rival to mobilize resources at early stages of the market development process, there is less rent dissipation, and no equalization, in a constrained preemption equilibrium. The first-mover advantage on the product market then results in more value for the less constrained firm, and in less value for the follower than when they playà la Cournot with perfect mobility. The leading firm maximizes value by entering immediately before its constrained rival, though later than made possible by its superior mobility. Greater uncertainty reduces the value differential to the benefit of the follower. It also increases the distance between the firms' respective investment triggers. The specifications and results are discussed in light of recent developments in the market for music downloads. "The first mover and only the first mover, the company that acts while others dither, has a true opportunity to gain time over its competitors -and time advantage, in this business, is the surest way to gain market share."
In the early phase of development, if only one firm invests it benefits from a monopolistic position until the market grows to a threshold level that triggers entry by the other firm. On the product market, if the first entrant does not benefit from a first-mover advantage, and both firms hold production capacities, they compete by choosing quantities simultaneouslyà la Cournot. The quantity choices can be capacity constrained. 2 When firms have no existing capacity and contemplate entry, a unique Markov perfect preemption equilibrium always obtains, in which firms invest at different market development thresholds. Each firm may enter first with the same probability. Competition for the benefit of leading the investment game, hence to be the only supplier for some period of time, leads to rent equalization and partial dissipation.
The present paper investigates the impact on equilibrium outcomes of two natural extensions to the benchmark model, separately and in combination. It first focuses on situations in which, if a firm leads the entry process, it benefits from a first-mover advantage when the other firm invests also and starts supplying. 3 The endogenous sequence of investments, and ex ante identical firms' value, are compared with the outcomes of the benchmark case in which early entry does not induce a favorable position in the market stage. The paper also examines the consequences of assuming that firms may not be symmetric in their ability to mobilize the resources they need to enter a new market. This is done by introducing limited mobility constraints, defined as firm-specific technological specifications. They capture realworld circumstances in which firms become aware of profitable market opportunities only when the level of demand is sufficiently high, or require some non negligible amount of time to install new productive assets.
Does the first-mover advantage impact the entry sequence of firms? Does it preserve the rent equalization and dissipation properties? Or can it generate a rent for the leader?
How can adjustment costs, or limited mobility constraints, modify equilibrium outcomes?
What is the consequence of an increase in growth or uncertainty, with limited mobility, and 2 The main virtues of the model appear clearly when compared with a reference contribution to the management science literature by Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998) . In the latter paper, the real option approach is used with two firms that may also interact strategically both in the investment stage (see the extension in Section 3, pp. 1027-8) and on the product market (Cournot competition). However, in the two-period setup firms may invest a given amount only once, at the same time 0, before competing in quantities on the market at time 1. Uncertainty is resolved between the two periods. In BLM (2007), firms face a continuously changing and uncertain demand with an infinite horizon, successive investments are possible, and can constraint quantity choices. The timing of investment decisions, and their discrete levels, are endogenous. 3 For recent real-options models that consider the case of a second-mover advantage, see Hoppe (2000) , Thijssen, Huisman, and Kort (2006) , and Mason and Weeds (2008) .
with a first-mover advantage? These questions find only incomplete answers in the empirical literature that explicitly refers to a real options framework to investigate the impact of firstmover advantages on entry decisions. In a research note, Folta and Miller (2002) conjecture that first-mover advantages accelerates entry. Folta and O'Brien (2004) use data from a broad array of industries to find support to their hypothesis that the choice by a given firm to enter a new activity is positively related to a measure of early mover advantages. In their study, entry -the dependent variable -is defined as observed activity by an existing firm in an industry in which the same firm had not reported involvement in the previous two years. This cannot fully capture the strategic dimension (in the game theoretic sense) that characterizes the entry choice by several firms on the same market. In particular, whether two firms enter almost simultaneously (the same year), or one after another over a large period of time (in two different years), is not considered in the econometric model. Therefore it is not clear whether a first-mover advantage on the product market, as gained by an early entrant, will impact the timing of decisions, and firms' value, in a given industry. In another recent empirical study, Driver, Temple, and Urga (2008) exploit the observed heterogeneity across forty industries, as measured in a quarterly survey over two decades. Despite considerable heterogeneity across industries, they find evidence that indicators of first-mover advantages (specifically, the R&D and advertising intensity) contribute to a positive relationship of investment to uncertainty.
At a finer level of analysis, however, it remains uneasy to disentangle the impact of industry wide characteristics from strategic decisions taken by interdependent firms.
In the theoretical analysis that follows, by assuming that a firm, if it enters first, will behave as a Stackelberg leader should the other firm enter also, and when limited mobility constraints are absent or weak, one obtains a unique preemption equilibrium again, as in the original setting with Cournot behavior. However, the leader enters earlier, the follower enters later, than without a first-mover advantage. This means that, although leadership in the short-run market subgame expands the range of market development levels for which the first entrant is the unique supplier, it only delays for a while the other firm's entry, without blockading it. The delay monotonically increases, while firms' value decreases, when the difference between the equilibrium profits of the leader and the follower in the market subgame increases. The leader obtains no rent from the first-mover advantage. The rent equalization property is preserved, and the two firms' equal value is lower than in the benchmark setup. This is because competition for the benefit of being the first supplier is even stronger in the Stackelberg scenario, leading to more dissipation than in the Cournot scenario. By contrast, sufficiently strong limited mobility constraints result in less dissipation and no equalization.
By dampening competition for the lead position, they transform the first-mover advantage on the product market, in the Stackelberg scenario, into an additional rent to the leader, and a loss for the follower, in comparison to firms' respective values in the Cournot setup, all other things remaining equal. Greater uncertainty reduces the value differential. It always benefits the less mobile firm, in that its constrained equilibrium expected value increases. It also increases the endogenous distance between the two firms' investment triggers.
The results are of interest because many business situations illustrate the proposed scenario of cumulative leadership, in which the firm that detects in advance a new market opportunity, and is able to mobilize resources promptly, preempts the lead position in the capacity development process, and thereby benefits from a first-mover advantage in the product market stage. The market for legal music downloads offers a recent example: demand was inexistent a few years ago, it is growing at an uncertain rate, large firms compete by distrib- The first-mover advantage is likely to be a long lasting phenomenon when it is supported by a combination of brand loyalty, a technical device or a proprietary format, and use habits, at the expense of late comers. Microsoft's market share is only a small portion of Apple's position -that is more than 70% of worldwide online digital music sales in mid 2008 -more than one year after Zune was introduced. In this example, a new consumer pays for a hardware (a portable media player) before getting access to an online music store. In addition, a customer gets used to specific routines (to search the catalog content, to download files, to pay) that render costly a shift to an alternative supplier. When satisfied with the first supplier, one is likely to keep consuming from it. This is emblematic of the many circumstances captured by the new model specification introduced here.
The remain of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the benchmark model is presented, together with the first-mover advantage specification we introduce, for the analysis to be self contained. In section 3, the equilibrium outcomes of the Cournot and Stackelberg scenarios are compared and characterized. In section 4, the impact on equilibrium outcomes of limited mobility constraints are examined. In section 5, comparative statics results describe the consequences of a change in growth and volatility. Final remarks appear in section 6.
The Model
This section presents briefly BLM's model in the same notation, augmented by a few additional specifications that introduce the Stackelberg scenario. For a more detailed description and intuitive comments please refer to the original paper.
Two risk-neutral symmetric profit-maximizing firms, f and −f , contemplate entry on a market to sell a non-differentiated good in quantities x f t and x −f t , respectively, at each point in time t. Production requires an investment in a positive integer number of capacity units, which augment existing capacity stocks k The fixed cost of acquiring a capacity unit is I in current value.
At time t ≥ 0, inverse demand is described by the function
where
t ≥ 0 is the total output, Y t ≥ 0 is a random shock, and D −1 (X t ) ≥ 0 is a non-stochastic term. Aggregate shocks (Y t ) t≥0 follow a geometric Brownian motion
with Y 0 > 0, α > 0 (growth rate), σ > 0 (volatility), and where (Z t ) t≥0 is a standard Wiener process. The time-invariant function D(.) is strictly decreasing, continuously differentiable, and integrable on R + , with
Within the interval [t, t + τ ) the timing of the game is as follows: 1) given the realization of Y t , and existing capital stocks, each firm f chooses to invest a number of capacity units ν f t ; 2) Given capacity units, each firm f selects an output level under capacity constraint
given output levels, market price is determined according to (1) .
The results presented in the next sections compare the Cournot and Stackelberg versions of the model. In the latter version, the first entrant is also a first-mover in the market subgame. In the former version of the model, the two firms choose quantities simultaneously.
In both scenarios, market outcomes depend on each firm's installed capacity, and although Y t is not bounded for above, an assumption guarantees that investments stop as soon as each firm holds one capacity unit (or more):
¥ Cournot Firms choose quantities simultaneously. Let k c = dx c e be the minimum capital stock (an integer) required to produce x c , that is the unconstrained equilibrium quantity for each firm. For a benchmark, as in BLM assume that the market subgame admits a unique equilibrium (x c , x c ), with 0 < x c ≤ 1, so that k c = 1. When firms both operate only one capacity unit each, they cannot be constrained.
¥ Stackelberg Firms choose quantities sequentially. Let k F = dx F e and k L = dx L e be the minimum capital stocks required to produce x F and x L , the unconstrained equilibrium quantities of the follower and the leader, respectively. The comparison of this scenario with the benchmark commands again to assume that the market subgame admits a unique equilibrium
No firm is constrained when both hold only one capacity unit.
Given capacities, in the Cournot and Stackelberg scenarios alike, it follows from (1) that the equilibrium of the market subgame does not depend on Y t . When a firm holds k capacity units while its rival holds l capacity units, its instantaneous gross profit is Y t π kl , where π kl , as computed in the market subgame, depends on installed capacity units only. There is no commitment by firms relative to the size of their investments, to the quantity they sell, nor to the sequence of entry, which is endogenous. Only one firm may choose to enter by investing in capacity units, or both firms may enter simultaneously, or sequentially. As no restriction on capacity is imposed in the investment game, firms are specified to stop investing when it is known with certainty that none of them will ever undertake any further investment, as it would only result in higher fixed costs. 5 The specification that firms invest in a production capacity, and not in an abstract project or entry ticket, offers a very natural mechanism to compare the different instantaneous profit levels firms earn across the two versions of the model, namely π 10 (monopoly profits), π 11
(Cournot duopoly profits), π F (Stackelberg follower's profits), and π L (leader's profits). Suppose that x c < 1, so that investing in one capacity unit is sufficient to supply the unconstrained Cournot output. Then standard demand specifications, say a linear D(.), lead to the usual ranking π F < π 11 < π L < π 10 . Still the magnitude of profit differences depends on the status of other capacity constraints. In particular, π L is relatively high if x L ≤ 1 (the slack case), and low otherwise, though strictly above π 11 , which is constant across the two cases. A less usual ranking occurs when x c = 1 < x m , so that investing in one capacity unit is exactly sufficient to supply the unconstrained Cournot output, but not the unconstrained monopoly quantity. It follows that π F = π 11 = π L < π 10 . This obtains whenever best-reply functions have a negative slope in the quantity plane, hence for a very large class of demand expressions. There is no need to evoke a more sophisticated technological issue, nor a very specific functional form. 6 As for the equality π 11 = π 10 , or π L = π 10 with a first-mover advantage, it is a limit case that can only be approached here (since demand is strictly decreasing), and will turn a useful reference for the comparison of investment triggers across the two versions 5 This is established rigorously in BLM (2007) as Proposition 1: for the investment game to be over, it is necessary that either 1) no capacity constraint binds in the short-run market subgame, or 2) the two firms' capacity constraints are binding in the short-run market subgame, and would remain so, should any firm invest in another unit. The first condition -which is satisfied in the Cournot and Stackelberg scenarios of the present model -is also sufficient. 6 Absent capacity constraints, and without introducing an additional process of imitation, innovation, or externalities, a very specific condition on the inverse demand function would be needed for the Stackelberg market substage equilibrium to coincide with the Cournot equilibrium, as shown in Colombo and Labrecciosa (2008) .
of the game. Note also that k c = k F = k L = 1 makes possible that π v0 > π 10 , with v > 1, in which case the first entrant is constrained with only one capacity unit and finds it profitable to invest more. This situation is left aside in this paper because it does not lead to other comparisons in instantaneous profit levels than already obtained with v = 1. Hereafter an investment in exactly one capacity unit simply coincides with the decision to enter.
The equilibrium concept is the Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE). This means that a firm's investment and output decisions at each point in time depend only on the current levels of capacity units and of the industry-wide shock. It follows that, given installed capacities, firms may not attempt to coordinate output decisions over time. At each date they play the unique equilibrium of the market subgame. 7 An MPE outcome of the game is an ordered sequence of investment triggers, with related instantaneous gross profit levels. The latter are denoted by y ij (with y ij = y ji ), where i and j refer to the firms' capacities immediately before Y t reaches the level y ij for the first time. Note that y 11 = ∞ since the game stops
In the next section, we first characterize the MPE in the Cournot scenario, when firms 
Cournot vs. Stackelberg
In the benchmark case, when both firms hold production capacities, they are assumed to choose individual quantities simultaneously,à la Cournot. The analysis investigates all situations for which
This simply says that, when both firms have entered, so that each of them produces the non-constrained quantity x c ≤ 1, they earn lower individual profits than a monopolist. For notational parsimony, as in the original model define
where r is a constant interest rate. 8 We have β > 1 for all r > α (the latter inequality must hold otherwise a firm's value is maximized by postponing investments for ever). 9 When the two firms may invest with no delay at any point in time, from t = 0 onward, their current value depends on the date at which each of them chooses to enter. Suppose a firm enters when Y t = y. Then the value of its competitor, if it enters later when Y t reaches a higher level y 0v , is
all v ≥ 1, where v is the number of units acquired by the opponent before the firm acquires its first (and single) unit. 10 The maximum F * (y) with respect to y 0v is obtained at
which does not depend on v. 11 When a firm invests in one capacity unit immediately, when Y t = y, while the other one remains out of the market as long as Y t has not hit y * 01 , its value is
for all y < y * 01 (recall from Proposition 1 in BLM, together with 0 < x c ≤ 1 by assumption, that the game ends as soon as the other firm enters by investing 1 capacity unit, or more).
the steps that lead to it.
9 I thank Benoit Chevalier-Roignant for suggesting that, if r is higher than the risk-free rate (e.g., firms may discount profits at the capital market rate), then the condition r > α authorizes a relatively high level of α. This makes sense in the case of publicly held firms that contemplate entry on an emerging market. See
Dixit and Pindyck (1994, pp. 147-150) for different interpretations of the discount rate in investment models. 10 The expression of value functions, as proposed in BLM, follows Harrison (1985, chapter 3) . The term When the same firm does not invest immediately at the current level y, and chooses to postpone entry until Y t reaches a higher level y 00 , its value is
for all y < y 00 . The maximum of L y 00 (y) with respect to y 00 , hereafter denoted by L * (y), is obtained at
which is strictly lower than (or equal to) y * 01 since π 11 < (=)π 10 . 12 If, at t = 0, a firm can commit relative to the level of Y t that triggers entry, and thereby be protected from preemption by its rival, it would enter at y L 00 . This describes a point of reference that will be useful in the following, and which corresponds to the stochastic time τ L 00 = inf{t ≥ 0 :
As y L 00 depends on short-run monopoly profits π 10 , not on π 11 , it will not be impacted by the level of profits earned in the short-run duopoly game when both firms have entered (in the Cournot and Stackelberg versions, indifferently). Observe from (5) and (7) that F * (0) = 0 > L(0) = −I. Moreover, F * (y), which is obviously strictly increasing with y for all relevant parameter values, is also strictly convex, since
all y > 0, while L(y) is strictly (weakly) concave if and only if π 11 < (=)π 10 , since
all y > 0. It follows that F * (y) − L(y) = 0 may admit up to two roots. Since y * 01 is a root, it is sufficient to observe that dF * (y)
and that dL(y)
to conclude that there exists an other positive root y p 00 < y * 01 if π 11 < π 10 , and that y
otherwise. This, together with the comparison of F * (y L 00 ) with L(y L 00 ), and the comparison of (6) with (9), lead to the following remark.
12 Ly 00 (y) is concave in y00 if and only if y00 < 1 + In words, when we let the profits π 10 of a constrained monopolist, which has invested in one capacity unit, exactly match the individual profits π 11 of unconstrained duopolists, L(y)
is a line which is tangent to the graph of F * at y p 00 = y L 00 = y * 01 . In the latter limit case only, the Cournot scenario collapses to the benchmark commitment situation, since the value of the two firms exactly equates the level of a firm protected from preemption.
To compare, introduce now a modification in the benchmark model by assuming that firms play sequentially in the market subgame. The first entrant anticipates that the other firm is going to start supplying later, when Y t reaches a given level, and accordingly adapts its behavior at that time,à la Stackelberg. To capture this in the largest possible class of functional specifications for the non-stochastic component of demand D, let the two firms earn asymmetric profits when they have both invested in capacity units. When the two firms are active, the one that entered first earns π L , while the second entrant earns π F , with π F ≤ π L . 13 As in the Cournot version, when only the leader is active, it earns monopoly profits π 10 . The counterpart to (3) now is
This specification is sufficiently general to capture a large class of circumstances. 14 Then substitute π F for π 11 in (5) to obtainF (y). The maximumF * (y) with respect to y 0v is reached atȳ *
13 In a similar continuous-time investment model, Smit and Trigeorgis (2004, chapter 9) suppress the Stackelberg equilibrium. They emphasize that, if quantities are chosen sequentially, the first mover's choice is not a best reply to the quantity chosen by the second mover. When the market subgame is repeated, the leader has an incentive to reduce its output. More generally, here the Stackelberg scenario may refer to a large class of circumstances in which the first player benefits from any advantage reflected by (12) . The many possible sources of the advantage include brand loyalty effects, switching costs, and other lock-in phenomena. See
Cottrell (2002) for several examples. 14 In the present paper, the possibility that the leader earns higher instantaneous profits when the follower has invested than in monopoly, that is π 10 < π L , is ruled out. This case is precisely investigated by Mason and all v ≥ 1. By comparing (13) with (6), one observes thatȳ * 01 > (=)y * 01 if and only if π F < (=)π 11 . Then substituteȳ * 01 for y * 01 and also π L for π 11 in (7) and (8) to obtainL(y) andL y 00 (y), respectively. The maximum ofL y 00 (y) with respect to y 00 is obtained at the same value as the maximum of L y 00 (y), that is y L 00 as displayed in (9) . This leads to a first claim:
Proposition 1 If the first entrant may commit at t = 0 relative to the level of Y t that triggers entry, it chooses to enter when Y t = y L 00 , independently of the nature of competition on the product market in the post-entry period, while
On the contrary, in the absence of commitment, the nature of competition impacts the timing of entry decisions. The possibility of playing first in the market subgame makes a difference. To see that, compare the slopes ofF * (y) andL(y) with the slopes of F * (y) and
if π F < π 11 , and
In words, for all positive values of y, in the Stackelberg scenario the slope of the second entrant's value function is strictly lower than in the Cournot scenario, while the slope of the first entrant's value function is higher than in the Cournot scenario.
Together withF * (0) = F * (0) = 0, andL (0) = L (0) = −I, this leads to conclude thatF * andL intersect at a lower value of y, we denote byȳ p 00 , than F * and L. In addition, it is sufficient to check thatF * (ȳ * 01 ) < lim y↑ȳ *
01L
(y) when π F < π L to conclude thatF * andL cannot intersect for any y >ȳ p 00 in the Stackelberg scenario.
Proposition 2 There existsȳ
On the time scale, this means that the two valuesF * andL equalize earlier in the Stackelberg scenario than in the Cournot setting, that isτ
It remains to examine when firms choose to be either the first or the second entrant, or to enter simultaneously. Let Y 0 ≤ȳ p 00 hereafter, for simplicity. There are three possible cases.
Suppose first that y <ȳ p 00 , which implies thatL (y) <F * (y). In that case each firm waits for the other to enter first, since leadership is less profitable. Suppose now that y ≥ȳ * 01 and that no firm has entered yet. Then both firms find it profitable to enter immediately. If one of the two firms leads by entering atȳ * 01 immediately before its rival, its value is Figure 1) . Eventually, whenȳ p 00 ≤ y <ȳ * 01 , it is valuable to take the lead sinceF * (y) <L (y). Therefore each firm has an incentive to "undercut" its rival on the segment [ȳ p 00 , y L 00 ] to preempt the lead position.
The dynamics of competition for the lead position in the investment stage when firms playà la Stackelberg in the short-run market subgame is the same as the one examined by BLM when firms playà la Cournot, other things remaining equal. All properties of the preemption equilibrium, including rent-dissipation and equalization, are robust to the change in specifications from (3) to (12) . The only differences are that 1) the leader enters earlier,
2) the follower enters later, and 3) each firm's value is lower in equilibrium. 15 The following claim summarizes the main features of the comparison. [Insert Figure 1 ]
In more intuitive terms, the preemption MPE is characterized by more competition when the two firms are interested in leading not only the order of entry in the investment stage, but also the sequence of moves in the short-run market stage. The possibility given by entering 15 The proof of the result is simple since it relies exclusively on the comparison ofF * andL with F * and L, respectively. Therefore there is no need to demonstrate again the characterization of a preemption equilibrium offered in the original setup, including the claim that only one firm invests at y p 00 (orȳ p 00 in the present paper). In BLM, this result is grounded on a continuous time representation of limits of discrete time mixed strategy equilibria, adopted by Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) , with firm f 's strategy defined as a function
representing the "intensity" with which f invests in ν f capacity units, given the existing stocks (k f , k −f ) and the shock Yt = y. A simpler alternative, as in see Grenadier (1996) , is to assume that, when firms choose the same point in time to enter, an exogenous random mechanism assigns the lead position to one of them with a given propability.
first, and then to anticipate the quantity choice of the second entrant to earn π L (in lieu of π 11 ) in the product market stage, is a bonus for the leader, a penalty for the follower. It makes the prize sweeter, and the defeat bitter. However, in equilibrium of the investment game this results in the leader entering earlier, and the follower entering later, that is in a longer installation period. (Here "installation" is the counterpart to "diffusion" in the terminology introduced by Tirole (1985, 1987) and in fine in a lower value for both parties. 16 Note that firms may not escape that situation by cooperating, in order to enter later, at some stochastic date τ >τ p 00 . This would not be a self-enforcing deal (here it is assumed that an agreement of this kind is not contractible for legal reasons). Supposing it takes place, the agreement would lead firms to obtain the same valueS(y) =
r−α y 00 − I´, where y 00 triggers simultaneous entry for both firms (their instantaneous gross profit is as in the Cournot scenario because there is no first-mover). A maximum valueS * (y) obtains for y 00 =ȳ s 00 . When Y t hits this threshold, each firm's value isS * (ȳ s 00 ). If a firm, say f , chooses to deviate while −f sticks to the collusive strategy, it may enter immediately before Y t hits 16 The extension of the assumption π F < π 11 < π L , and consequently of Proposition 3, to more than two firms, is not obvious. In a static hierarchical Stackelberg model where n firms choose outputs sequentially,
Anderson and Engers (1992) provide a necessary and sufficient condition on a demand parameter and the number of firms for the first mover to earn lower profits in Stackelberg than in Cournot if n > 2. This is done with a specific form for the demand function that allows for the linear specification as a particular case, and marginal costs equal to zero. With the same demand and variable cost specifications, Anderson and Engers (1994) construct a discrete time sequential investment model, in which n ≥ 2 firms choose the different times at which they enter. This is done by paying a fixed cost and choosing an output level, one after another, before reaching time 0, that is the opening date of the market where outputs are sold once and for all. (In BLM the two firms may enter anytime while the market develops, so that simultaneous entry is not excluded a priori, and firms compete in the market subgame at each point in time afterwards.) When fixed entry costs are not too high, it is found that all n firms enter and there is equalization of actualized profits, as in the present Stackelberg scenario (see Proposition 2, p. 839). Further research could thus consist in using the ranking of profits revealed by Anderson and Engers (1992) in the hierarchical Stackelberg model with more than two firms to generalize the results obtained here with a duopoly.
ȳ s 00 , that is atȳ s 00 − ε, with ε arbitrarily small, for a valueL(ȳ s 00 ). Accordingly, in the case of simultaneous entry each colluding firm earns the instantaneous gross profit π 11 fromτ s 00 on, for ever, while in case of deviation f earns π 01 fromτ s 00 − ε toτ * 01 , and then π L fromτ * 01 on, again for ever (in the two cases firms pay the entry cost I at -almost -the same time).
Since π L ≥ π 11 , the collusive entry agreement cannot be implemented for all π 01 > π 11 . 17 Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 3 in the particular case of a linear demand function.
The graphs of L and F * converge to the same point as y approaches y * 01 from below. The distance betweenL andF * , when y approachesȳ * 01 , can be measured by observing that
π F , which is proportional to the difference between the profits earned by the leader and the follower in the short-run market subgame. 18 One also obtains a longer time period during which the first entrant is the unique supplier. Although it does not lead to a blockaded entry, playing first in the short-run market subgame postpones the other firm's investment for a while. This comes at some cost, since the leader enters earlier, hence at more risk, and the two firms' values are lower, than in the benchmark situation. 19 The comparison of MPE outcomes across the two versions can be made more precise.
First, it depends on the difference between π F and π L . One way to formalize this is to define the non-negative differences γ and δ, with π F = π 11 − γ and π L = π 11 + δ, before substituting π 11 − γ for π F and π 11 + δ for π L in (14) and (15) . Then one obtains
r−α > 0. In words, given π 11 , when γ increases the graph ofF * becomes flatter, while the graph ofL becomes steeper (also when δ increases). Therefore:
Remark 2ȳ
p 00 andF * (ȳ p 00 ) =L (ȳ p 00 ) are monotone decreasing when profit differences γ and/or δ increase. 17 Of course this holds also in the Cournot alternative, and also ifȳ s 00 >ȳ * 01 , in which case π L ≥ π 11 is sufficient to conclude. 18 Beyondȳ * 01 , each firm's value is a linear function of y. This is because, for y ≥ȳ * 01 , and if no entry occurred, both firms will enter immediately. With probability 1/2, firm f enters first and its value is π L r−α y − I; firm −f follows and its value is π F r−α y − I (see Figure 1) . 19 In real-world circumstances, a first-mover advantage is likely to erode over time. It will not be sustainable for ever. Brand loyalty, or consumption habits, are certainly not immutable, so that the difference between profit levels π F , π11, and π L is likely to shrink progressively (see Cottrell and Sick (2005) for historical evidence). Therefore firms' equilibrium values, as derived in the present setting, should be seen as benchmarks vis-à-vis more realistic situations in which the first investor's superiority is only temporary.
Moreover, (9) and (13) imply that the difference between y L 00 andȳ * 01 depends on π F and π 10 , but not on π L , while (14) and (15) 
There are only two particular situations in which we do not obtain either only equality signs (as in the latter remark) or only strict inequality signs throughout the comparison of all threshold values of y: (i) if π F = π 11 = π L < π 10 , we haveȳ p 00 = y p 00 < y L 00 < y * 01 =ȳ * 01 , which simply means that the Stackelberg situation "degenerates" to the Cournot case; (ii) if π F < π 11 = π L = π 10 , we haveȳ p 00 < y p 00 = y L 00 = y * 01 <ȳ * 01 , which compares a particular Stackelberg outcome with the benchmark situation in which the leader may commit to enter when Y t reaches y L 00 (the leader's profits can be made equal to both monopoly profits and oneshot duopoly profits by relaxing the strict monotonicity assumption of the demand function).
We may thus connect the ranking of investment triggers, across the two versions of the game, to all possible rankings of instantaneous profit levels a firm may earn in the short-run market subgame.
The Case of Limited Mobility
From Proposition 3, we know that in equilibrium each firm may lead the investment schedule, or follow, with probability 1/2, in the Cournot and Stackelberg scenarios alike. The indeterminacy of the identity of the leader/follower is a consequence of the assumption that firms are a priori symmetric. To avoid relying on a random selection mechanism that distributes roles without any economic rationale, one may introduce an investment cost asymmetry as in Pawlina and Kort (2001) , a marginal cost asymmetry, or a quality differential, as suggested by Smit and Trigeorgis (2004) . The firm with a lower fixed or marginal cost, or with a higher demand, would be the one that preempts its less profitable competitor.
An alternative approach, adopted here, is to relax the assumption that firms are equally able to mobilize resources they need with no delay at any point in time, from t = 0 onward.
Clearly this perfect mobility specification does not fit many real-world circumstances. The fact that a new demand takes off is certainly not obvious at early stages. Once detected, the installation of production and distribution resources of all kinds, as required to start supplying, cannot be immediate. As Prescott and Visscher (1977, p. 379) put it, "some entrants become aware of a profitable market before others or require longer periods of time in which to "tool up"." To illustrate, consider again the market for legal music downloads mentioned in introduction. In a press conference concerning the first anniversary of the iTunes Music Store, Steve Jobs emphasized the fact that Apple was prompter than rivals to assess the sales potential of that market when it was only embryonic: "Zero to 70 million in one year, you know, if a year ago anyone had predicted that iTunes would sell 70 million songs during its first year, they would have been laughed out of town." Following Apple's early entry, after a couple of years the firm's market value rose significantly more than the ones of subsequent entrants. 20 Can this fact be considered as prima facie evidence that rents may originate from the superior ability to assess the potential of an emerging market?
To answer this question, a simple -and most realistic -departure from the frictionless world described so far consists in assuming that, at least in the early development stages of a new market, firms may not be equally able to explore emerging opportunities, or to set up the assets they need to exploit them. In other words, firms may be imperfectly and asymmetrically able either to identify the potential of a burgeoning market, or to move fast and invest as soon as they find it profitable to do so. The simplest possible way to capture this idea is to introduce mobility constraints Y t ≥ y f and Y t ≥ y −f for the two firms f and −f , respectively, with 0 ≤ y f ≤ y −f . 21 The constraints formalize the assumption that the management is unable to seize market opportunities, or to initiate an investment process, if the market has not grown up to a certain level, which can be firm-specific. The levels y f and y −f cannot be adjusted by firms in the short-run; they are technological (or organizational) parameters. 22 I assume they are known by all parties, and are unchanged across the Cournot and Stackelberg versions of the model. Since the analysis focuses on an infant industry, and the level y L 00 is not only lower than y * 01 andȳ * 01 , but also a reference point common to 20 See the transcript of the press conference from Steve Jobs concerning the first anniversary of the iTunes Music Store, dated April 29th, 2004, available at: http://www.macobserver.com. 21 Mobility thresholds can be given a chronological interpretation by defining the corresponding stochastic dates τ f and τ −f . Since the time to "tool up" is measured from date t = 0, that is from the opening date of the market onwards, τ f and τ −f can be understood as durations. The more mobile firm f is able to enter immediately after date τ f . Firm −f is slower, as it takes more time τ −f to satisfy the technological conditions that allow it to enter. If y f = 0, then τ f = 0 ≤ τ −f (i.e., the more mobile firm is perfectly mobile as it is able to invest immediately at all market development levels). 22 The mobility constraints clearly differ from the decision lags in Gilbert and Harris (1984, Section 3) where a firm is assumed to be able to invest strictly before its rival. Hence the first investment can occur at any the Cournot and Stackelberg scenarios (see Proposition 1), it is convenient to specify that
e., both firms are sufficiently mobile to enter as soon as Y t hits y L 00 ). 23 How are entry decisions, and firm values, impacted by the limited mobility constraints?
If the current industry-wide shock is strictly less that y f , obviously no entry may occur, for all y f , y −f . Otherwise the exact timing of entry depends on the comparison of mobility parameters with y p 00 in the original setup (orȳ p 00 with a first-mover advantage). When both firms are almost perfectly mobile, in the sense that y −f ≤ y p 00 (or y −f ≤ȳ p 00 ), we already know that a free MPE outcome obtains in which only one firm enters at y p 00 (resp.ȳ p 00 ) while the other firm waits until τ * 01 (resp.τ * 01 ). 24 Any firm can be either the leader or the follower in the investment subgame, with equiprobability. In that case, the specification that mobility parameters y f and y −f may differ across firms plays no role.
Of more interest are all situations in which at least one constraint bites. When limited mobility constraints are symmetric, and sufficiently strong so that no free preemption equilibrium obtains, the "floor" y f = y −f prevents rent competition to fully dissipate and equalize monopoly rents. In the constrained preemption equilibrium, one of the two firms, say f , enters immediately before Y t reaches the constraint, and −f again enters at y * 01 (or atȳ * 01 ). The limited mobility constraints may also differ across firms. If y f < y −f firm f is given the possibility not to invest immediately when Y t hits y f . When Y t < y −f , firm f faces no threat of entry by the rival −f , and thus may choose not to invest until Y t reaches any higher level y 00 in the interval [y f , y −f ]. In the time dimension, it may postpone entry to any point τ 00 in [τ f , τ −f ], during which it is protected from preemption. When positive, the difference between mobility parameters makes it impossible for firm −f to contest the lead position for a while. Firm f may thus exploit the lack of market awareness or of technological agility of its rival to postpone entry, and nevertheless to enter first, at less risk, and at some profit. Since opting for leadership in the entry process is a dominant strategy, and the value function is monotone increasing with y, firm f 's optimal choice is to enter at y −f − ε, with ε arbitrarily small (henceforth consider ε is negligible to simplify the notation). 25 In other words, the more mobile firm finds it optimal to postpone entry as much as possible, to enter an instant before the rival is able to contest the lead position. To summarize: 23 With no upper bound on mobility parameters, immobile firms would be defined for τ f = τ −f = ∞. , not atȳ p 00 , in a free premption equilibrium. 25 The reasoning is similar to the choice of price in a Bertrand duopoly, with asymmetric marginal costs, when the low cost supplier maximizes profits by charging a price almost equal to the rival's marginal cost.
Proposition 4 Suppose y p 00 ≤ y f (orȳ p 00 ≤ y f ) so that the MPE is constrained: (1) If constraints are symmetric, firm f (with probability 1/2) invests immediately before Y t reaches y f = y −f for the first time, and firm −f (with probability 1/2) enters at y * 01 (resp. atȳ * 01 ); (2) If constraints are asymmetric, firm f (with probability 1) invests immediately before Y t reaches y −f > y f for the first time, and firm −f enters at y * 01 (resp. atȳ * 01 ).
[Insert Figure 2] Obviously, when the constraint Y t ≥ y −f is sufficiently stringent, the identity of the first entrant is no more indeterminate. Leadership is more cumulative than in the case of perfect mobility. The firm that is aware in advance of the market potential, or requires a shorter period of time to trigger the investment procedure, is also the one that leads the entry process.
However, for a given y −f the leading firm does not necessarily enter at the same point in time in the Stackelberg scenario, limited mobility has no impact on the free MPE of the investment game. Otherwise:
(ii) ifŷ < y −f ≤ y p 00
26 The existence ofŷ andy follows from the continuity of value functions, together withL (ȳ (iii) if y p 00 < y −f ≤ȳ
In less formal terms, in cases (i) and (ii), that is when firms are still relatively mobile (i.e., y −f ≤ y p 00 ), firm f enters at y p 00 in the Cournot case, and −f at y * 01 as in the absence of constraints. 27 However, in the Stackelberg scenario, the more mobile firm f finds it profitable to enter at y −f , whereas −f enters atȳ * 01 , and both entities benefit from it. More precisely, in case (i) there is rent equalization and dissipation in the Cournot scenario, as in the benchmark model. However, f 's value is higher than −f 's value in the Stackelberg scenario. In the latter case the two firms' respective values, although higher than with no limited mobility constraints, remain lower than in Cournot. In that sense, the first-mover advantage in the product market stage does not pay. In (ii), the follower's value in the Stackelberg scenario is higher than with perfect mobility, although it remains lower than any of the two firms' values with Cournot. An important outcome is that the Stackelberg leader's value is highest. That is, cumulative leadership is profitable for the leader.
The latter claim holds in the other two cases, where firms are less mobile (i.e., y p 00 < y −f ). In (iii) and (iv) the more mobile firm, f , enters at y −f (i.e., immediately before the shock reaches that level), which is higher than y p 00 , in the Cournot and Stackelberg cases alike (−f enters at y * 01 and atȳ * 01 , respectively). An important result is that the leader benefits from the first-mover advantage (i.e.,L
, while the follower is worse off (i.e.,F * ¡ y −f ¢ < F * ¡ y −f ¢ ). By reducing competition for the lead position in the investment game, asymmetric limited mobility constraints turn the first-mover advantagea property that characterizes the short-run market subgame -into more value for firm f at equilibrium in the long-run investment game, at some cost for the rival −f . Formally,
27 The values F * (y −f ) and L(y −f ) do not appear in (16) (17) because in the Cournot scenario no firm will enter at y −f < y p 00 .
The larger the distance δ between Cournot instantaneous profits π 11 and the leader's profits π L , the higher the marginal value, for f , as a function of firm −f 's mobility parameter y −f .
Note that in (iii) the two Cournot players' equilibrium value in a free preemption equilibrium (that is F * (y p 00 ) = L(y p 00 )) is lower than their respective values in a constrained MPE. This means that, when no first-mover advantage characterizes the product market, and −f 's limited mobility constraint bites, there is less rent dissipation than when y −f is lower than y p 00 . Moreover firm values are not equal as f benefits more than −f from the delayed entry process (
The only difference in (iv) is that the follower's value, in the Stackelberg scenario, is now larger than the benchmark, that is Cournot firms' equal equilibrium value with perfect mobility. 28 This is because the leader enters late, at a relatively high y −f , abovey. This compensates for the reduction in the instantaneous profits firm −f earns, on the product market, as a second mover.
Growth and Volatility: Comparative Statics
This section discusses the effect of a change in the parameters that appear in the geometric 
hence the effect of the growth parameter α onȳ p 00 , and on firms' value, for all y f , y −f , is ambiguous. 29 A higher drift may either decrease or increase the difference betweenL(y) and 28 For some parameter values we may havey ≥ y It follows that the impact of a change in α on firms' (constrained) preemption equilibrium value can also be either negative or positive, depending on parameter values.
which is therefore negative. The effect of σ on the difference D is thus univocal. Since (21) holds on the interval (0, y L 00 ], the impact of a change in σ on the level of Y t at which entry takes place can be inferred from the negative sign of dD(y)/dσ, as follows:
(1) In a free preemption MPE, when σ increases, the leader enters later, at a higher level y p 00 (a consequence ofL(y) RF * (y) if and only if y Rȳ p 00 ). 30 The follower enters latter also, at a higher levelȳ * 01 (this is because dȳ * 01 /dσ = (∂ȳ * 01 /∂β) (dβ/dσ) > 0). 31 Here the sign of the change of the difference betweenȳ p 00 andȳ * 01 , and in the two firms' equal valueF * (ȳ p 00 ) =L(ȳ p 00 ), at this level of generality, is indeterminate.
(2) In a constrained preemption MPE, when σ increases, the leader's entry date remains the same (y −f does not depend on σ), and again the follower enters later, so that the "installation" gap between the two investment triggers increases also. Since a higher σ results in a narrower distance D(y −f ), the value differential between the leader and the 30 An increase in σ will not change the level of y at which the leader enters untilȳ p 00 (which does depend on σ) reaches y −f from below, in which case one gets back to a free preemption equilibrium. The conclusion that a higher σ delays investments is intuitive and standard. To compare, Mason and Weeds (2008) find that greater uncertainty can lower the leader's trigger point when the follower's investment benefits the leader, so that π 10 < π L is possible, a case we do not consider here.
31 It is easy to check that ∂ȳ * 01 /∂β < 0, while dβ/dσ < 0 is proved in the appendix.
follower decreases. This occurs always at some benefit for firm −f , since one checks
Moreover, without adding more structure to the model,
When the derivative is negative (positive), more volatility penalizes (benefits) the leading firm f . Sinceȳ * 01 exp(−1/β) < y L 00 if and only if π F /π 01 > exp(−1/β), firm f 's value will increase with σ only when the profit ratio π F /π 01 is sufficiently high for the entry threshold y −f to be possibly in the interval (ȳ * 01 exp(−1/β), y L 00 ], in which case more volatility benefits firm f also. To summarize:
Proposition 6 In a mobility constrained preemption equilibrium, the effect of the growth parameter is ambiguous, while more uncertainty reduces the positive rent differential D(y −f ), down to zero whenȳ p 00 reaches y −f from below, at the advantage of the follower, −f . It also increases the gap between the two investment triggers y −f (a parameter) andȳ * 01 (which increases with σ).
Final Remarks
If firms are perfectly mobile, by assuming that, when the other firm enters, the leading investor benefits from a first-mover advantage in the duopoly market subgame (to capture, say, a brand loyalty, or consumption habits), a preemption equilibrium obtains in which the leader invests earlier, and the follower later, than in the benchmark scenario. However, the longer incumbency period does not result in additional rents to the leader. The two firms' equilibrium values are equal. They are also lower than in the absence of first-mover advantage. The rent-equalization outcome is preserved, with more dissipation. More profits for one player at each point in time results in less expected value for both in a dynamic setup.
This result thus reinforces the usual conclusion that, by competing for the lead position on a growing market with development uncertainty, firms actually take in value. It also clearly rationalizes the case of real-world firms that enter very early on a new market, seeking the benefit of a pioneering move, and nevertheless demonstrate no superior financial performance in the long run.
However, another conclusion of the paper is that the latter result is rooted in the crucial -albeit usually implicit in the literature -assumption that firms may enter at any point in time, with no delay, at the early stages of a new market development process. This perfect mobility assumption does not reflect all observed real-world circumstances. Indeed a very different picture is obtained once firm-specific limited mobility constraints are introduced.
They capture situations in which investors are not equally able to explore new market opportunities, or to install promptly the assets they need to exploit them. The constraints serve resolving the indeterminacy of the identity of the leader/follower in a preemption equilibrium, in a similar way as a cost asymmetry or a quality differential. They also lead to unfamiliar outcomes.
In the absence of first-mover advantage, the dampening-of-competition effect of mobility constraints results in higher and asymmetric firm values. The first investor, in equilibrium, is the firm that may detect in advance the potential of a growing market, and/or is capable to trigger the entry process at a lower level of demand. It invests immediately before the less mobile rival may enter. With a first-mover advantage in the short-run market stage, what was a Pyrrhic victory for the leader in the case of perfect mobility turns into a profitable success story when mobility is imperfect. The market advantage amplifies the impact of mobility constraints on firms' performance. The leader's value is higher, while the follower's one is lower, than in the benchmark Cournot case, other things (including mobility constraints) remaining equal. While a change in growth has an ambiguous effect, more volatility is shown to reduce the positive difference in firms' value, to the benefit of the follower, and to increase the distance between the two firms' respective investment triggers.
Arguably, these findings contradict common wisdom, which sees only virtue in the ability to move fast. In the model, the leading firm finds it most profitable to enter immediately before its rival, though possibly much later than with perfect mobility. The point is certainly not to enter early, but only earlier than a competitor. In this framework, a long duration between the entry dates of two firms, as observed on a growing market, is no indication of a proportionally large gap in the managers' ability to seize new opportunities. To illustrate, on the market for legal music downloads, where Apple clearly benefits from a first-mover advantage, there is no reason to interpret the late introduction of Zune by Microsoft as an evidence of extreme bureaucratic inertia. It is consistent with a value maximizing behavior, with only a limited difference in the two firms' swiftness or their managers' "vista", and with a highly uncertain demand. This also resulted in a large value differential, as predicted by the model with a first-mover advantage and limited mobility.
The source of rent this analysis points to is actually a technological or managerial limitation of at least one firm's ability to detect a burgeoning demand, or to mobilize resources.
When firms compete for the lead position, the limitation is a necessary condition for an entrepreneurial competitor to benefit from the advantage it seeks by entering first. This theoretical output can be tested empirically, as one may check whether limited mobility constraints play a role in real-world circumstances. On a given emerging market, if the value of an early investor -which can be approximated by the capital market value -can be observed to benefit from a first-mover advantage, one may conclude that the industry was not prompt at mobilizing the resources needed to enter, to the advantage of the first investor.
If early entry does not result in intra-industry profit differentials, it reveals that unleashed rent-seeking behavior has taken place. There is no reason to conjecture, on purely analytical grounds, that the latter case is more frequent than the former.
Consider the three terms in turn. First,
which is positive (zero) if and only if y < (=)ȳ * 01 /ỹ, whereỹ ≡ exp
Next y 
which is negative for all π 01 ≥ π L ≥ π F > 0 and β > 1. The latter monotonicity implies that
As the expression on the right side of the inequality sign is monotone increasing with β, it is sufficient to impose β = 1 to find π 01 − π Second, for all β > 1 one finds
Third,
Then observe that . . when y p 00 < y −f ≤y. In the latter case, f benefits more than −f from the delayed entry process (F * y −f < L y −f ). In the Stackelberg scenario, f is better-off than in the Cournot case (L y −f > L y −f ), while the follower is worse off (F * y −f < F * y −f ).
